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MAGIC AND HOPE: RELAXING TRIPS-PLUS 
PROVISIONS TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO 
AFFORDABLE PHARMACEUTICALS 
Sean Baird* 
Abstract: Competing interests and values collide at the intersection of 
public health, international trade, and intellectual property. Although 
highly successful in securing rigid patent protection provisions in the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), the United States was dissatisfied with features of the agreement. 
In response, the United States began to negotiate bilateral free trade 
agreements which, while compliant with the TRIPS Agreement, include 
unflinchingly rigid intellectual property provisions. This Note argues that 
invidious “TRIPS-Plus” provisions in U.S. Free Trade Agreements, which 
require greater patent protections than the TRIPS Agreement, obstruct 
access to affordable pharmaceuticals desperately needed by impoverished 
populations around the globe. To encourage access to affordable drugs in 
low-income countries, the United States should amend its free trade 
agreements by incorporating a balancing test to determine when it is 
necessary to relax rigid trade provisions. 
Introduction 
 On November 7, 1991, Earvin “Magic” Johnson, an all-star basket-
ball player for the Los Angeles Lakers, announced his retirement from 
the National Basketball Association (NBA).1 Johnson had recently been 
diagnosed with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), which 
causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).2 Winner of five 
NBA championships, a twelve-time All-Star, league most valuable player 
(MVP), and three-time NBA Finals MVP, Johnson was at the pinnacle of 
his profession.3 Disclosing his diagnosis shocked the world and many 
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1 Tracey E. George, Secondary Break: Dealing with AIDS in Professional Sports After the Ini-
tial Response to Magic Johnson, 9 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 215, 216 (1992). 
2 Id. 
3 Avi Sinensky, Comment, Not That There Is Anything Wrong with That: The Practical and 
Legal Implications of a Homosexual Professional Athlete, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 1009, 1017 
(2008). 
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thought the end of Johnson’s storied NBA career also meant the end of 
his life.4 After all, in the early 1990s, treatment for HIV/AIDS was rare 
and diagnosis was considered a death sentence.5 In fact, before 1996, 
an estimated fifty percent of those diagnosed with HIV would develop 
AIDS within ten years.6 
 Twenty years later, Johnson is a thriving fifty-two-year-old.7 On No-
vember 7, 2011, Johnson celebrated with athletes, politicians, research-
ers, and celebrities as his foundation pledged a one million dollar gift 
to promote continued HIV/AIDS awareness and testing.8 Upon his ini-
tial diagnosis, Johnson took nearly twenty pills a day to manage the dis-
ease, but thanks to breakthroughs in the pharmaceutical industry, 
Johnson is now on highly effective antiretroviral therapy (HAART), 
which requires only a few daily medications.9 Antiretroviral therapy 
prolongs life and improves the health of those infected with 
HIV/AIDS.10 On that somber November day in 1991, Johnson defiantly 
proclaimed that he would “‘beat the disease.’”11 Twenty years later, ac-
cess to HAART has enabled Johnson’s proclamation to ring true.12 
 A world away in Bwindi, Uganda, Hope Tukahirwa has not been as 
fortunate.13 Tukahirwa’s husband and son both contracted AIDS and 
died before HAART was even nominally available in sub-Saharan Af-
rica.14 Like Johnson, Tukahirwa contracted HIV and currently receives 
                                                                                                                      
 
4 Jack McCallum, 20 Years Later: Magic Putting on Performance of His Life Off the Court, 
Sports Illustrated (Nov. 7, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/ 
writers/jack_mccallum/11/06/magic.johnson.hiv.announcement/index.html. 
5 Ronda B. Goldfein & Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, From the Streets of Philadelphia: The 
AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania’s How-to Primer on Mitigating Health Disparities, 82 Temp. L. 
Rev. 1205, 1208 (2010). 
6 Living with HIV/AIDS, Ctrs. for Disease Prevention & Control, http://www. 
cdc.gov/hiv/resources/brochures/livingwithhiv.htm (last modified June 21, 2007). 
7 Greg Beacham, Magic Johnson Still Beating HIV 20 Years Later, Huffington Post (Nov. 7, 
2011, 9:09 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/08/magic-johnson-hiv-20-years-later_ 
n_1081752.html. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Charles T. Collins-Chase, Comment, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Develop-
ing Countries Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 763, 786 (2008). 
11 See George, supra note 1, at 215 (quoting Magic Johnson with Roy S. Johnson, I’ll 
Deal with It, Sports Illustrated, Nov. 18, 1991, at 16, 19). 
12 See Beacham, supra note 7. 
13 Daniel Howden, Licensing Deal Threatens Cheap Pharmaceuticals, Independent (Dec. 1, 
2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/licensing- 
deal-threatens-cheap-pharmaceuticals-2148089.html. 
14 See id. The earliest statistics on HAART coverage in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate 
that, in 2005, a mere seventeen percent of persons living with HIV/AIDS had access to 
antiretroviral drugs (ARVs). See World Health Org. & UNAIDS, Progress on Global 
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antiretroviral therapy.15 Unlike Johnson, however, Tukahirwa’s access 
to HAART hangs in a tenuous balance as trade laws dictate her ability 
to procure treatment.16 Tukahirwa understands that HAART has pro-
longed her life and she expresses concern about the effect of trade laws 
on her access to this life-saving therapy.17 “‘In the old days, people were 
dying like rats. The drugs were too expensive and if it happened again 
we would be back in the old days.’”18 
 Infectious diseases plague the developing world.19 By the end of 
2009, an estimated 33.3 million people were living with HIV/AIDS.20 
Of that total, 22.5 million live in sub-Saharan Africa, 4.1 million live in 
Southeast Asia, and 1.4 million live in Central and South America, 
demonstrating a disproportionate impact on low and middle-income 
countries (LMICs).21 In 2009, approximately 1.8 million people died 
from AIDS-related causes, contributing to an estimated 16.6 million 
children orphaned from HIV/AIDS.22 The disease continues to spread 
as approximately 2.6 million new cases developed in 2009.23 Globally, 
only an estimated thirty-six percent of those needing antiretroviral 
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(2006), available at www.who.int/hiv/fullreport_en_highres.pdf. 
15 See Howden, supra note 13. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See UNAIDS, Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 16, 
19 (2010), available at http://www.unaids.org/documents/20101123_globalreport_em.pdf; 
World Health Org., Global Tuberculosis Control 2011, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
WHO TB Report 2011], available at http://www.who.int/tb/publications/global_report/ 
2011/gtbr11_full.pdf; World Health Org., World Malaria Report 2011 viii–xii (2011) 
[hereinafter WHO Malaria Report 2011], available at http://www.who.int/malaria/ 
world_malaria_report_2011/9789241564403_eng.pdf. While this Note primarily considers 
HIV/AIDS, other infectious diseases like malaria and tuberculosis have contributed to dire 
public health outcomes in LMICs. WHO TB Report 2011, supra, at 1; WHO Malaria 
Report 2011, supra, at viii–xii. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) esti-
mates that 216 million people were infected with malaria during 2010 resulting in 655,000 
deaths, ninety-one percent of which occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. WHO Malaria Re-
port 2011, supra, at 73. Moreover, 8.8 million people contracted tuberculosis in 2010 and 
nearly 1.5 million people died from the disease. WHO TB Report 2011, supra, at 9. Low 
and middle-income countries (LMICs) are overwhelmingly impacted by tuberculosis, with 
fifty-nine percent of all cases occurring in Asia and twenty-six percent in Africa. Id. at 10. 
20 UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 180. 
21 See id. at 180, 187, 201; see also United Nations Dev. Programme, Human Develop-
ment Report 2011, Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All 163–64 (2011) 
[hereinafter UNDP 2011], available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (noting that LMICs are 
typically in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America). 
22 See UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 185–86. 
23 See id. at 16. 
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therapy actually receive it.24 In sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, 
less than forty percent of those in need of HAART currently receive 
treatment.25 Finally, less than thirty percent of children under the age 
of fifteen in need of antiretroviral therapy are currently on HAART.26 
 An international trade tug of war threatens access to lifesaving 
pharmaceuticals for Hope Tukahirwa and millions like her.27 High-
income countries (HICs) seek patent protection to promote innovation 
produced by pharmaceutical companies.28 LMICs seek flexible patent 
laws that permit the advancement of public health by promoting access 
to affordable treatment.29 
 Competing interests and values collide at the intersection of public 
health, international trade, and intellectual property.30 In an attempt to 
mediate these countervailing issues, the international community 
sought to establish trade standards through the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), which promulgated the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (“the TRIPS Agreement”).31 The 
TRIPS Agreement established minimum standards for “[t]he protec-
tion and enforcement of intellectual property rights” among WTO 
                                                                                                                      
24 World Health Org., UNAIDS, & UNICEF, Towards Universal Access: Scaling 
Up Priority HIV/AIDS Interventions in the Health Sector 53 (2010), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241500395_eng.pdf. Access to phar-
maceutical treatment for diseases other than HIV/AIDS is quite low. See WHO Malaria 
Report 2011, supra note 19, at 20, 44. For example, access to anti-malarial medication 
serves as a barrier to treatment in the developing world, hampered by marked pricing 
increases in 2011. See id. Additionally, opportunistic infections combined with HIV/AIDS 
further complicate treatment, due, in large part, to the cost of drugs. See Ellen ‘t Hoen et 
al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents and Access to Medicines for All, 14 J. Int’l 
AIDS Soc’y, Mar. 27, 2011, at 1, 7. For example, tuberculosis is a common opportunistic 
infection of HIV/AIDS, and pharmaceuticals for patients struggling with co-infection are 
expensive. See id. 
25 See World Health Org., UNAIDS, & UNICEF, supra note 24, at 53. 
26 Id. at 5. 
27 See Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Basic Survival Needs and Access to Medicines—Coming to 
Grips with TRIPS: Conversion + Calculation, 38 J.L. Med. & Ethics 520, 520–21 (2010); How-
den, supra note 13. 
28 See Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Com-
pulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 71, 71–72 (2011); Cynthia M. 
Ho, Global Access to Medicine: The Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, 35 Fordham Int’l 
L.J. 1, 4 (2011). 
29 See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 28, at 71–72; Ho, supra note 28, at 4. 
30 See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 28, at 71–72; Ho, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
31 See Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 
66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1286 (1998); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 979, 980 (2009). 
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members.32 Critics accused the stringent patent protections under the 
TRIPS Agreement of favoring HICs, asserting that the agreement “ig-
nore[s] . . . public health conditions” of LMICs.33 In response to grow-
ing concerns about the effects of rigid patent laws on public health, 
WTO signatories adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment and Public Health (“the Doha Declaration”) in November 2001.34 
The Doha Declaration emphasizes that the TRIPS Agreement “can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.”35 
 In subsequent years, however, the United States has diminished 
the import of the Doha Declaration by instituting more rigid intellec-
tual property protection provisions in bilateral and multilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs).36 These stringent provisions are called 
“TRIPS-Plus” provisions because they require higher levels of patent 
protection than mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.37 TRIPS-Plus pro-
visions have been criticized for limiting access to pharmaceuticals.38 
                                                                                                                      
32 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 7, 27, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round Vol. 1c. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [here-
inafter TRIPS Agreement]; see McManis, supra note 31, at 1286; Yu, supra note 31, at 980. 
WTO membership offers numerous advantages and countries at all levels of development 
ratified the TRIPS Agreement to exploit these benefits. Aileen M. McGill, Note, Compulsory 
Licensing of Patented Pharmaceuticals: Why a WTO Administrative Body Should Determine What 
Constitutes a Public Health Crisis Under the Doha Declaration, 10 Wake Forest Intell. Prop. L. 
J. 69, 72 (2009). 
33 Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 Ind. L.J. 827, 828 (2007). At the 
same time, the AIDS pandemic began gaining notoriety, advancing serious concerns re-
garding public health and infectious diseases. See Hoen et al., supra note 24, at 3 (discuss-
ing a lawsuit between the post-apartheid government of South Africa and pharmaceutical 
companies regarding amendments that South Africa had made to legislation in order to 
readily provide low-cost antiretrovirals); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical 
Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 447, 448 (2011). 
34 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 479, 504–05 (2011); 
Beatrice Lindstrom, Note, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provi-
sions in Trade Agreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 
917, 949 (2010). 
35 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/ 
MIN(01)/DEC/1,41.I.L.M. 746, ¶ 4 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. The Doha 
Declaration promoted LMICs’ interests in the predominance of public health over com-
mercial priorities. See Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 526. 
36 See Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 531–33. 
37 See id. at 532. 
38 See Oxfam Int’l, Undermining Access to Medicines: Comparison of Five US FTA’s 
1 ( June 2004), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/Intellectual_Property/ 
IP_and_Access_to_Medicines/UnderminingAccessToMedicines.pdf; Puymbroeck, supra note 
27, at 532–33. 
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 In particular, the United States has taken an unyielding approach 
to data exclusivity and compulsory licensing, which Congress failed to 
address in the “Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy.”39 To ensure 
that Hope Tukahirwa and millions like her are afforded access to inex-
pensive pharmaceuticals, all U.S. FTAs should be amended to include a 
balancing test that weighs the benefits and detriments to determine 
when it is necessary to relax data exclusivity and compulsory licensing 
provisions.40 This balancing test, which has been used by the WTO in 
the past when resolving disputes, looks at: “(1) the importance of inter-
ests or values that the challenged measure is intended to protect; (2) 
the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to the realiza-
tion of the end pursued by that measure; and (3) the trade impact of 
the challenged measure.”41 
 Part I of this Note identifies the problem of rigid TRIPS-Plus provi-
sions in U.S. FTAs by tracing their development through intellectual 
property laws in the United States, the TRIPS Agreement, and the 
Doha Declaration. Part II demonstrates how TRIPS-Plus provisions 
limit access to affordable pharmaceuticals by examining current and 
proposed U.S. FTAs. Part III asserts that the Bipartisan Agreement for 
Trade Policy failed to address problematic TRIPS-Plus provisions and 
asserts that the United States must amend its FTAs so that impoverished 
populations have access to affordable pharmaceuticals. 
I. The Development of TRIPS-Plus Provisions in U.S.  
Free Trade Agreements 
 TRIPS-Plus provisions in U.S. FTAs impede access to pharmaceuti-
cals for indigent populations.42 The similarities between U.S. patent law 
                                                                                                                      
 
39 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent 
TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 
325, 331 (2011) (describing how the United States reasserted its commitment to protecting 
public health and promoting access to medicines in U.S. FTAs); see Puymbroeck, supra note 
27, at 532–33; Charles B. Rangel, Moving Forward: A New, Bipartisan Trade Policy That Reflects 
American Values, 45 Harv. J. on Legis. 377, 387–88 (2008). 
40 See infra notes 205–254 and accompanying text. 
41 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 305–308, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
WTO Gambling]; Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, ¶ 164, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter WTO Beef]; Sharon E. 
Foster, Prelude to Compatibility Between Human Rights and Intellectual Property, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 
171, 206 (2008). 
42 See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Leg-
acy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS 
Provisions, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 921, 962–63 (2007); Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for 
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and the TRIPS Agreement demonstrate the United States’s influence in 
establishing global intellectual property standards.43 Despite the suc-
cess of the United States in shaping global intellectual property stan-
dards, the TRIPS Agreement maintains several flexibilities, namely data 
exclusivity and compulsory licensing, which were affirmed by the Doha 
Declaration.44 The United States’s dissatisfaction with the level of intel-
lectual property protection afforded by the TRIPS Agreement 
prompted the proliferation of TRIPS-Plus provisions in U.S. FTAs.45 
A. Values and Ideals in U.S. Patent Law 
 The preeminence of patents in the United States is evidenced by 
the fact that patents are constitutionally protected to promote innova-
tion and discovery.46 A patent is a grant of property issued by a gov-
ernment that provides limited rights to the patent owner.47 A patent 
owner in the United States is granted monopolistic control over his or 
her invention for twenty years, during which time no one may make, 
sell, or use the patented product, absent permission from the patent 
holder.48 This exclusive right promotes innovation by enabling the pat-
ent owner to avoid pricing competition when selling the patented 
product.49 In return for monopolistic power to exclude, a patent owner 
must disclose the technological processes and data behind the prod-
uct.50 Other producers use this information, saving on the cost of re-
                                                                                                                      
Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1469, 1497–502 (2007); 
Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 532; Sell, supra note 33, at 453–55. 
43 McGill, supra note 32, at 78. 
44 See Doha Declaration, supra note 35, ¶ 5. 
45 See Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 532; Sell, supra note 33, at 448, 553–55. 
46 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
47 Black’s Law Dictionary 970 (9th ed. 2009) (defining patents as “the governmen-
tal grant of a right, privilege or authority”). It is also important to note that patent rights 
are geographically finite, requiring protection from each country in which innovators seek 
to distribute their patents. Ho, supra note 28, at 9. 
48 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing that a patent term in the United 
States begins on the date the patent is granted and extends twenty years from the applica-
tion date); id. § 271(a) (establishing that patent infringement occurs when one “makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention”). 
49 See Caroline Manne, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and TRIPS: The Countries 
That Cried Wolf and Why Defining “National Emergency” Will Save Them from Themselves, 42 
Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 349, 349–50 (2010). 
50 See Jon Matthews, Note, Renewing Healthy Competition: Compulsory Licenses and Why 
Abuses of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards Are Most Damaging to the United States Healthcare Indus-
try, 4 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 119, 121 (2010). 
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search and development while also expediting the regulatory process, 
in order to offer competitive pricing when the patent terminates.51 
 Patents are particularly valuable to the drug industry given the 
plethora of research and development required to produce pharma-
ceuticals.52 When a drug is no longer under patent, pharmaceutical 
companies must compete with generic producers who provide medi-
cines at much lower prices.53 Pharmaceutical companies assert that re-
search and development challenges require a rigid patent system to 
recover investment, turn profit, and promote continued innovation.54 
 In the context of international trade, pharmaceutical companies 
have much at stake as LMICs produce generic versions of patented 
drugs and sell these medications around the world, undercutting brand-
name profitability.55 Although the pharmaceutical industry ranks as one 
of the most profitable industries in the United States, these patent con-
cerns have led to the development of powerful special interest groups 
that the United States relies on when considering trade agreements, in-
cluding the TRIPS Agreement.56 
                                                                                                                      
 
51 See Rangel, supra note 39, at 403–04; Matthews, supra note 50, at 121. 
52 See Manne, supra note 49, at 353 (noting that “[a]mong high technology industries, 
the pharmaceutical industry as a whole reinvests the greatest percentage of sales revenue 
into research and development,” requiring a rigid patent system to recover investment and 
turn profit). But see Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options 
Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 103, 111 (2003) (noting 
that drug companies invest more profits on administration and marketing than on re-
search and development). To develop a drug, pharmaceutical companies invest an average 
of twelve years and eight hundred million dollars. See Cong. Budget Office, A CBO 
Study: Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry 2 (2006) [here-
inafter Pharma R&D]. Additionally, many of the products and chemicals developed are 
never sold and of those sold, only approximately three of ten are profitable. See Manne, 
supra note 49, at 353. 
53 See Lindstrom, supra note 34, at 974; Matthews, supra note 50, at 133; McGill, supra 
note 32, at 86; Frank Jordans, Novartis Drug Company to Cut Almost 2,000 Jobs, Huffington 
Post ( Jan. 13, 2012, 12:08 PM), http://huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/13/novartis-job-cuts_ 
n_1204137.html (examining the dramatic impact of losing a patent on brand-name produc-
ers by detailing drug maker Novartis’s decision to cut nearly two thousand jobs once its best-
selling hypertension drug, Diovan, comes off patent). 
54 See Manne, supra note 49, at 353–54. The most profitable multinational pharmaceu-
tical companies, however, spend more on advertising and administration (approximately 
thirty percent) than they do on research and development (approximately nineteen per-
cent). Jennifer Bjornberg, Note, Brazil’s Recent Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution or Retalia-
tion?, 27 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 199, 219 (2006). 
55 See, e.g., Adam Chilton, India’s Evolving Patent Laws and WTO Obligations: The Rejection 
of Abbott Laboratories’ Application for a New Kaletra Patent, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 296, 297 
(2011) (referring to India as “the pharmacy of the world”). 
56 See Pharma R&D, supra note 52, at 2, 4; Sell, supra note 33, at 464; McGill, supra 
note 32, at 78. Many commentators note the apparent revolving door between the phar-
maceutical industry and the U.S. government. See Sell, supra note 33, at 455; Zach Carter, 
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B. Global Expansion of U.S. Patent Ideals Through the TRIPS Agreement 
 The combination of special interests and traditional value placed 
on patent protection has encouraged the United States to enforce its 
patent ideals globally by linking patent protection and international 
trade through the TRIPS Agreement.57 Touted as “unquestionably the 
most important development in international intellectual property law 
[in a century],” the TRIPS Agreement “attempts to strike a balance be-
tween the long term social objective of providing incentives for future 
inventions and creation, and the short term objective of allowing peo-
ple to use existing inventions and creations.”58 To accomplish this, the 
agreement requires all WTO signatories to implement minimum stan-
dards of intellectual property law.59 
 The United States’s influence is acutely evident throughout the 
TRIPS Agreement’s patent provisions, which practically mirror U.S. 
patent law.60 For example, like U.S. patent law, the TRIPS Agreement 
grants patent owners exclusive rights to prevent others from making, 
                                                                                                                      
Bill Daley’s Big Pharma History: Drugs, Profits and Trade Deals, Huffington Post (Nov. 28, 
2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/28/bill-daley-big-pharma-trans-
pacific-partnership_n_981973.html. For example, William Daley served as the Commerce 
Secretary under the Clinton administration and worked with U.S. pharmaceutical giants to 
curtail the use of more affordable generic drugs abroad. See Carter, supra. Daley later 
served as a board member for Abbott Laboratories, while the company clashed with Thai-
land over compulsory licenses for antiretroviral medications. Id. Daley most recently 
served as the White House Chief of Staff under President Obama. Id. Moreover, Mickey 
Kantor, formerly the U.S. Trade Representative, is currently a pharmaceutical industry 
lobbyist, vigorously advocating for TRIPS-Plus provisions. See Sell, supra note 33, at 455. 
Pharmaceutical lobbying efforts are not limited to the United States and the pharmaceuti-
cal industry in the European Union (EU) works hard to influence the EU’s trade commis-
sion with regard to patent protections in trade agreements. See Abbott & Reichman, supra 
note 42, at 962. 
57 See McGill, supra note 32, at 76, 78. 
58 McManis, supra note 31, at 1286; see Yu, supra note 31, at 1007; Fact Sheet: TRIPS and 
Pharmaceutical Patents, World Trade Org. (Sept. 2006),http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm01_e.htm. 
59 See Manne, supra note 49, at 358. Although the TRIPS Agreement regulates all as-
pects of intellectual property, including copyright, trademark, and patents, the standards 
for patents are particularly poignant with regard to access to pharmaceuticals. See TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 32, Part II, §§ 1–8; Manne, supra note 49, at 350–51. 
60 McGill, supra note 32, at 78. Many WTO signatories had little or no experience with 
intellectual property prior to the TRIPS Agreement. See Matthew Turk, Note, Bargaining 
and Intellectual Property Treaties: The Case for a Pro-Development Interpretation of TRIPS but Not 
TRIPS Plus, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 981, 991, 994 (2010). The United States was able 
to exploit the lack of intellectual property expertise in LMICs to its advantage during the 
TRIPS Agreement negotiations. See id. at 994. 
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using, selling, or importing the patented product for twenty years.61 
Moreover, neither the TRIPS Agreement nor U.S. patent law permits 
exceptions for patenting pharmaceuticals or pharmaceutical proc-
esses.62 Both the United States and the TRIPS Agreement prohibit the 
use of compulsory licensing for products not developed locally.63 Lastly, 
both the United States and the TRIPS Agreement stipulate that in ex-
change for a period of monopolistic control, the patent owner must 
disclose the invention “in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for 
the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art . . . .”64 
 Although the United States was largely successful in expanding its 
patent ideals through the TRIPS Agreement, LMICs maintained con-
siderable flexibility to promote access to drugs.65 This success is high-
lighted by the TRIPS Agreement’s treatment of data exclusivity and 
compulsory licensing.66 
1. Data Exclusivity 
 The TRIPS Agreement requires patent holders to disclose relevant 
information regarding the development of the patented product, in-
cluding clinical data.67 Pharmaceutical companies invest a significant 
amount of time and money to develop the clinical data required to 
patent new drugs.68 Generic drug companies rely on the clinical data 
collected by brand-name drug companies in order to demonstrate that 
the generic drug is pharmacologically equivalent to the brand-name 
pharmaceutical.69 In doing so, generic producers avoid the inordinate 
time and expense required to generate this data, enabling expeditious 
regulatory approval and delivery of affordable medicines upon the ex-
                                                                                                                      
61 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, arts. 28.1, 33; see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 
271(a) (2006). 
62 McGill, supra note 32, at 78–79. 
63 Id. 
64 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)(4); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 29. 
65 See Sell, supra note 33, at 448; Yu, supra note 34, at 493–95 (noting that because of 
negotiation tactics used by LMICs, the TRIPS agreement maintains ambiguities and flexi-
bilities which promote the interests of LMICs); McGill, supra note 32, at 78–79. 
66 Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory 
Licensing, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 367, 383 (2011); Pedro Roffe & Christoph Spennemann, 
The Impact of FTAs on Public Health Policies and TRIPS Flexibilities, 1 Int’l J. Intell. Prop. 
Mgmt. 75, 78–79 (2006). 
67 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 29. 
68 See Pharma R&D, supra note 52, at 2. 
69 See Rangel, supra note 39, at 403–04. 
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piration of brand-name patents.70 The TRIPS Agreement requires pro-
tection of such data but affords signatories broad discretion to utilize 
clinical data to protect the public and promote public health, as long as 
steps are taken to prevent unfair commercial use.71 Moreover, scholars 
contend that in light of the TRIPS Agreement’s purpose and objectives, 
the agreement does not require a period of data exclusivity, contrary to 
U.S. patent law.72 
2. Compulsory Licensing 
 A compulsory license is a government authorized license to a third 
party for the purpose of manufacturing and producing a patented in-
novation without consent from the patent owner.73 Article 31 governs 
compulsory licenses under the TRIPS Agreement, granting a govern-
ment broad discretion in issuing these licenses.74 The following re-
quirements must be met in order to obtain a compulsory license: (1) 
the country must ensure that the third party seeking the license at-
tempts to obtain authorization from the patent holder on reasonable 
commercial grounds; (2) the scope and duration of the compulsory 
license must be limited to the purpose for which the license was author-
ized; (3) the compulsory license must be predominately used “for the 
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use;” 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Laura Chung, Use of Paragraph 6 System for Access to Medicine, 36 N.C. J. Int’l L. & 
Com. Reg. 137, 180–81 (2010); Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 82. 
71 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, arts. 31, 39(3); Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 
Human Rights Inst., Prescription for Failure: Health & Intellectual Property in 
the Dominican Republic 28 (2010) [hereinafter Georgetown], available at http:// 
scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hri_papers/5; Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 82. 
72 See Carlos María Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of 
Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 69, 84 (2002); Rangel, 
supra note 39, at 403–04. The objectives of the TRIPS Agreement note that “[t]he protec-
tion and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion 
of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 32, art. 7 (emphasis added). The principles of the TRIPS Agree-
ment note that “[m]embers may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.” Id. art. 8.1 (emphasis 
added). Correa asserts that in light of the objectives and principles, data exclusivity is only 
required in limited instances and that governments should have access to clinical data for 
the purposes of protecting public health. See Correa, supra, at 84. 
73 Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement 
Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 99, 107 (2004). 
74 See Harris, supra note 66, at 383; Harris, supra note 73, at 107–08. 
118 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33:107 
and finally (4) the country must provide the patent holder with “ade-
quate remuneration . . . taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization.”75 Article 31 may be waived in cases of extreme urgency, 
national emergency, or public non-commercial use.76 
 Although HICs and LMICs reached a compromise on compulsory 
licensing, the issue became increasingly contentious upon implementa-
tion.77 HICs were dismayed with the lack of clarity surrounding terms 
like “adequate remuneration” and “national emergency.”78 LMICs were 
frustrated with Article 31(f) which stipulates that compulsory licenses 
must be predominately used for distribution within the domestic mar-
ket.79 Because many low-income countries lack manufacturing capacity, 
compulsory licensing under Article 31 does not provide a viable method 
of obtaining pharmaceuticals at a competitive price.80 At the same time, 
alarm over HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis grew as developing 
countries struggled to contain and treat infectious disease epidemics.81 
These concerns led to the signing of the Doha Declaration at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in 2001.82 
C. A Blow to U.S. Interests: The Doha Declaration and Article 31bis 
 As WTO signatories began implementing the TRIPS Agreement, 
the scourge of HIV/AIDS proliferated and infections increased by ten 
percent from 2000 to 2001.83 At that time, the World Health Organiza-
                                                                                                                      
 
75 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 31(b)–(h). 
76 Id. art. 31(b). 
77 See Chung, supra note 70, at 140–41; Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: 
Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 371, 409–
10 (2009). 
78 Ho, supra note 77, at 409–10 (providing that “[w]ith no clear limits, the interpreta-
tion of what constitutes adequate remuneration seems left to the discretion of national 
authorities”); Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ for Non-Voluntary 
Patent Licensing, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L. 927, 962 (2008) (noting that royalty rates for remu-
neration have ranged from 0.02% to 8%). 
79 See Chung, supra note 70, at 140–41. 
80 Id. 
81 See Harris, supra note 66, at 385–86. The South African government attempted to 
reduce the cost of antiretrovirals by enacting the South African Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997. Id. at 384. This act enabled local manufac-
tures to produce antiretrovirals through compulsory licensing and also enabled manufac-
tures to import these pharmaceuticals from countries that produced generic versions of 
the antiretrovirals at lower costs than the patented versions. Id. 
82 Id. at 385–86. 
83 Compare UNAIDS & World Health Org., AIDS Epidemic Update 1 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/publications/ 
irc-pub06/epiupdate01_en.pdf (noting that forty million people were living with HIV/ AIDS 
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tion estimated that less than four percent of those in need of HAART 
had access.84 It is in this context that the Doha Declaration “recog-
nize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
[LMICs], especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, ma-
laria and other epidemics.”85 WTO delegates agreed that signatories 
should interpret and implement the TRIPS Agreement in a way that 
promotes public health and access to medicines for all.86 
 Intellectual property flexibilities promoted by the TRIPS Agree-
ment were reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration.87 Specifically, the Doha 
Declaration implicitly affirmed the TRIPS Agreement’s deferential data 
exclusivity provisions and explicitly confirmed the use of compulsory 
licenses.88 The Doha Declaration granted broad discretion with regard 
to compulsory licensing, asserting that WTO signatories have “the right 
to grant compulsory licences [sic] and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licences [sic] can be granted.”89 Perhaps 
                                                                                                                      
 
in 2001), with UNAIDS & World Health Org., AIDS Epidemic Update 3 (2000), available 
at http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/publications/irc- 
pub05/aidsepidemicreport2000_en.pdf (demonstrating that thirty-six million people were 
living with HIV/AIDS in 2000). 
84 World Health Org. & UNAIDS, Accelerating Access Initiative: Widening 
Access to Care and Support for People Living with HIV/AIDS 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev_care/isbn9241210125.pdf (noting that only an estimated 
230,000 people were receiving antiretrovirals in 2001 although approximately six million 
people were in need of treatment). 
85 Doha Declaration, supra note 35, ¶ 1. 
86 Id. ¶ 4. 
87 See id.; Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 78. 
88 See Doha Declaration, supra note 35, ¶ 5. 
89 Id. ¶ 5(b). Another flexibility affirmed by the Doha Declaration is the TRIPS Agree-
ment’s silence on parallel importation as granting approval for individual signatories to es-
tablish their own regime for parallel importation and exhaustion. See id. ¶ 5(d) (confirming 
that “[t]he effect of the provisions in the TRIPS agreement that are relevant to the exhaus-
tion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its own regime 
for such exhaustion without challenge”). Parallel importation occurs when products pro-
duced and marketed by a patent holder in one country are imported to another country 
without approval from the original patent owner. World Health Org. & Directorate 
Gen. of Drug & Food Control, The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals 33–34 
(2000), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h1459e/h1459e.pdf. The legal 
principle, exhaustion, provides that when a company begins selling its product in the market 
of a particular country, the patent holder’s rights in the product are exhausted. See Ho, supra 
note 42, at 1501 n.147. Thus, the purchaser of the product may resell the patented good in 
another country at varying prices, without regard to the patent holder. See id.; Sell, supra note 
33, at 453–54 (illustrating parallel importation by asserting that if a drug company sells a 
patented drug more affordably in country X than in country Y, then country Y is permitted 
to import the drug from country X). Parallel importation favors LMICs because it enables 
them to exploit differential pharmaceutical pricing policies thereby obtaining more afford-
able drugs. See Ho, supra note 42, at 1501; Lindstrom, supra note 34, at 951. Pharmaceutical 
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most importantly, the Doha Declaration recognized the ineffectiveness 
of compulsory licensing for countries with limited or no manufacturing 
capacity.90 To address this weakness, WTO signatories amended the 
TRIPS Agreement with Article 31bis, which enables countries with lim-
ited or no manufacturing capacity to import generic drugs from other 
countries, thereby promoting access to more affordable medicines.91 
 Despite the Doha Declaration’s affirmance of deferential data ex-
clusivity and compulsory licensing as valuable mechanisms to promote 
access to medicine, the United States dominated the TRIPS Agreement 
negotiations.92 A World Bank study concluded that low-income coun-
                                                                                                                      
companies are opposed to parallel importation given that the profitability of their products 
relies, in part, on differential pricing. Ho, supra note 42, at 1501. The TRIPS agreement ex-
plicitly declines to reach the issue of parallel importation, thereby promoting flexibility with 
regard to this mechanism and deferring to the discretion of WTO signatories. TRIPS Agree-
ment, supra note 32, art. 6 (noting that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address 
the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights”). 
90 See Doha Declaration, supra note 35, ¶ 6; Chung, supra note 70, at 140–41; Harris, 
supra note 66, at 386. 
91 World Trade Org., Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement: Article 31bis, 
WTO (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm [here-
inafter Article 31bis]; see Chung, supra note 70, at 141, 152; Harris, supra note 66, at 386. 
To import pharmaceuticals under Article 31bis, a country must be a “least developed 
country” or demonstrate that it lacks manufacturing capacity to produce the desired 
product; the country must inform the WTO about the type and quantity of drug it seeks to 
import; and the country must take reasonable measures to prevent dispersion of the drug 
to other countries. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 939–42; Chung, supra note 70, 
at 143. The exporting country must issue a compulsory license to a manufacturer within 
the country and notify the WTO. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 942–43. The com-
pulsory license may only be issued for noncommercial use, a national emergency, or cir-
cumstances in extreme urgency. Id. Article 31bis exempts the importing country from 
providing “adequate remuneration” to the patent holder but requires the exporting coun-
try to provide an unspecified amount for remuneration. See id. at 944; Chung, supra note 
70, at 141. Very few countries have amended their trade laws to promote the use of Article 
31bis, thereby negating its usefulness. See Chung, supra note 70, at 139, 166 (noting that 
only Switzerland, the European Communities, and Pakistan amended their national trade 
laws to enable the issuance of compulsory licenses for the purpose of exportation). In 
2007, Canada and Rwanda became the first and only countries to use Article 31bis. See id. 
at 152, 170. The complicated Canada-Rwanda deal took over three years to complete, 
thereby diminishing the system’s ability to respond to national emergencies. See id. at 169–
74 (highlighting the difficulties associated with use of Article 31bis in the Canada-Rwanda 
deal). The generic pharmaceutical company partnering with Rwanda has indicated that it 
is not likely to participate in another deal given that it was required to absorb tremendous 
expenses, including the cost of negotiations with the patent holding pharmaceutical com-
pany, the cost of providing unique packaging or labeling for the generic drugs, and the 
cost of export. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Breaking Patents, 32 Mich. J. Int’l. L. 461, 469 (2011); 
Chung, supra note 70, at 169–74. 
92 Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 369, 380, 401 
(2006); McGill, supra note 32, at 79. 
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tries stand to lose twenty billion dollars from transfers of technology, 
including pharmaceuticals, if the TRIPS Agreement is fully imple-
mented.93 Still, the United States had to accept compromises during 
the negotiations and has remained discontent with the level of protec-
tion afforded to pharmaceutical patents by the TRIPS Agreement.94 
This dissatisfaction spurred the proliferation of TRIPS-Plus provisions 
in bilateral U.S. FTAs.95 
D. The Proliferation of TRIPS-Plus Provisions in U.S. FTAs 
 The TRIPS Agreement creates a regulatory “floor,” consisting of 
minimum levels of protection that must be afforded to intellectual 
property by all WTO signatories.96 Countries are therefore permitted to 
seek higher levels of protection in FTAs, and the United States has 
done so in negotiating bilateral FTAs with numerous countries.97 These 
trade agreements are commonly called TRIPS-Plus U.S. FTAs because 
they incorporate more stringent intellectual property protection provi-
sions than the TRIPS Agreement, while also limiting the freedoms and 
flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement.98 
 Beginning with the Bush administration and continuing through 
the Obama administration, the U.S. has sought to “ensur[e] that the 
provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing 
intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United States re-
flect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States 
                                                                                                                      
93 Int’l Bank for Reconstr. & Dev., Global Economic Prospects and the Devel-
oping Countries 2002 xvii (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT 
GEP/Resources/335315-1257200370513/gep2002complete.pdf. 
94 Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 79; Sell, supra note 33, at 448. 
95 See James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 Wash. L. 
Rev. 421, 466 (2011); Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 79. 
96 See Gathii, supra note 95, at 466; Ruse-Khan, supra note 39, at 329; Taubman, supra 
note 78, at 944. 
97 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 1(1); Gathii, supra note 95, at 466. Since 2001, 
the United States has negotiated FTAs with Vietnam, Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Morocco, 
Australia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Dominican Re-
public, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Thailand, Panama, Oman, Republic of Korea, and the 
United Arab Emirates. See Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 532. Moreover, the United States 
attempted an FTA with the Southern African Customs Union which includes Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. See Gathii, supra note 95, at 469. Addition-
ally, the United States is in the midst of negotiating an enormous FTA with Australia, 
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, and Vietnam. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 27, 29 (2011). 
98 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 962–63; Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 532; 
Sell, supra note 33, at 453. 
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law.”99 Pressure from the pharmaceutical industry led to the implemen-
tation of several TRIPS-Plus provisions, including rigid data exclusivity 
policies and limitations on compulsory licensing, thereby impeding 
access to affordable medicines for indigent populations in desperate 
need.100 
1. TRIPS-Plus Impact on Data Exclusivity Provisions 
 TRIPS-Plus data exclusivity provisions in U.S. FTAs constrict the 
flexibilities afforded by the TRIPS Agreement.101 Whereas the TRIPS 
Agreement applies a deferential approach towards data exclusivity, U.S. 
FTAs apply the same level of protection afforded under U.S. patent 
                                                                                                                      
99 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–210, § 2101(b)(4) 
(A)(i)(II), 116 Stat. 993, 996 (2002) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2006)); 
see also Sell, supra note 33, at 466 (criticizing the Obama administration’s approach to inter-
national trade as it relates to pharmaceutical patents). 
100 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 962; Ho, supra note 42, at 1497–502; 
Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 532; Sell, supra note 33, at 453. Several other TRIPS-Plus 
provisions are commonly found in U.S. FTAs, including: limitations on parallel importa-
tion; linkages between marketing and drug approval; and extensions for patent terms. Ho, 
supra note 42, at 1495–502; Sell, supra note 33, at 453–55. Several U.S. FTAs provide patent 
holders with an exclusive right to bar parallel importation. See Ho, supra note 42, 1501–02 
(noting that U.S. FTAs with Morocco and Singapore require each country to grant patent 
holders the right to block parallel imports). Moreover, the U.S.-Australia FTA prohibits 
parallel importation where the patent holder has indicated that a product is solely meant 
for sale within a specified country. See United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Austl., art. 17.9(4), May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter U.S.-Aus. FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta. As one author 
noted, these provisions “eliminate[] a TRIPS-compliant opportunity to access more af-
fordable patented drugs; this is especially crucial in the case of second-line HIV/AIDS 
drugs that are patented and for which no generics are available.” Sell, supra note 33, at 
454. Another method of deterring generic pharmaceutical competition found in U.S. 
FTAs but not in the TRIPS Agreement, involves the link between marketing and drug reg-
istration, known as linkage. See Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements on Access to Medicines, 84(5) Bull. World Health Org., 399, 401–02 (2006). 
Linkage provisions require national health authorities to deny marketing approval to ge-
neric pharmaceuticals prior to patent expiration unless the patent holder consents. See id. 
at 401. Moreover, national health authorities must notify a patent holder about applica-
tions for generic pharmaceutical approval. See id. Linkage systems may delay generic 
pharmaceutical companies from introducing more affordable medications and may even 
deter generic competition. See id. at 402; Sell, supra note 33, at 454. Finally, although the 
TRIPS Agreement requires that patents last for twenty years, many TRIPS-Plus FTAs incor-
porate patent term extensions. See Correa, supra, at 400; Sell, supra note 33, at 454. The 
United States permits patent term extensions for the pharmaceutical industry because 
drug companies must seek regulatory approval before distributing new drugs and the in-
dustry asserts that extended patent periods account for regulatory delays. See Correa, su-
pra, at 400. U.S. FTAs include patent term extensions without allocating a maximum time 
period for the extension. See id. at 400–01. 
101 Georgetown, supra note 71, at 28. 
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law.102 In U.S. FTAs, competing manufacturers are prohibited from re-
lying on clinical data for five to fifteen years after the date of a pharma-
ceutical’s initial regulatory approval.103 Brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies favor data exclusivity provisions because they enable drug 
companies to exploit profits by suspending competition.104 
 Clinical data is costly and time consuming, and data exclusivity 
provisions may prohibit generic producers from introducing more af-
fordable medication immediately following a patent’s expiration by 
prohibiting access to data previously gathered by the patent holder.105 
To compete, generic producers may be forced to conduct their own 
costly research and development, negating their ability to provide af-
fordable drugs.106 Alternatively, generic companies would have to delay 
regulatory approval and production of generic drugs.107 Thus, TRIPS-
Plus data exclusivity provisions in U.S. FTAs effectively empower patent 
holders to extend monopolistic control of pharmaceuticals by obstruct-
ing generic competition, consequently diminishing access to medicines 
for indigent populations.108 
2. TRIPS-Plus Impact on Compulsory Licensing 
 Although to the TRIPS Agreement enables WTO signatories to es-
tablish their own national compulsory licensing scheme, TRIPS-Plus 
                                                                                                                      
102 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 271(a) (2006); United States-Panama Trade Promotion 
Agreement, U.S.-Pan., art. 15.10, June 28, 2007 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text; 
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, art. 16.10, Apr. 12, 2006 [here-
inafter U.S.-Peru FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/peru-tpa/final-text; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Morocco, art. 15.10, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta; United States-
Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art 17.10, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter 
U.S.-Chile FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ 
chile-fta; Georgetown, supra note 71, at 28; Chung, supra note 70, at 180–81; Rangel, supra 
note 39, at 404. 
103 Chung, supra note 70, at 180–81; Ellen R. Shaffer & Joseph E. Brenner, A Trade 
Agreement’s Impact on Access to Generic Drugs, 28 Health Affairs w957, w961–64 (2009). 
104 Sell, supra note 33, at 453. 
105 See Chung, supra note 70, at 180–81; Sell, supra note 33, at 453. 
106 See Sell, supra note 33, at 453. 
107 See Chung, supra note 70, at 180–81; Sell, supra note 33, at 453. 
108 See Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data Under the TRIPS 
Agreement and Its Progeny: A Broader Perspective 2 (2004), available at http://www. 
iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Reichman_Bellagio4.pdf; Chung, supra note 
70, at 180–82 (discussing FTAs with Chile, Jordan, and Morocco); Harris, supra note 66, at 
394 (discussing FTAs with Singapore, Australia, South Korea, and Oman); Roffe & Spen-
nemann, supra note 66, at 82; Sell, supra note 33, at 453–55. 
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provisions in U.S. FTAs significantly limit compulsory licensing.109 Un-
der U.S. FTAs, parties may typically only grant compulsory licenses in 
emergency situations, as an anti-trust remedy, or for public non-
commercial use.110 Notably, U.S. FTAs do not define “emergency situa-
tions” or “public non-commercial use.”111 Some TRIPS-Plus provisions 
require “reasonable and entire” remuneration for patent owners as op-
posed to “adequate remuneration” required by the TRIPS Agree-
ment.112 Finally, U.S. FTAs permit challenges to compulsory licenses on 
the grounds that a license was not warranted under the specific circum-
stances.113 By confining a government’s ability to issue compulsory li-
censes and providing an opportunity for the patent holder to challenge 
the issuance of compulsory licenses, TRIPS-Plus compulsory licensing 
provisions diminish a generic producer’s ability to compete and enable 
the patent holder to manipulate drug pricing.114 The net result is di-
minished access to medicines for Hope Tukahirwa and millions like 
her.115 
II. Why TRIPS-Plus Provisions are Problematic: Rigid Data 
Exclusivity Provisions and Compulsory Licensing  
Provisions Obstruct Access to Medicine 
 TRIPS-Plus provisions promote unyielding data exclusivity and 
limit compulsory licensing to the detriment of indigent populations 
                                                                                                                      
109 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 31(b)–(h); Doha Declaration, supra note 
35, ¶ 5(a)–(d); see also Ho, supra note 42, at 1499–1500 (noting that U.S. FTAs limit com-
pulsory licensing beyond TRIPS requirements). 
110 U.S.-Aus. FTA, supra note 100, art. 17.9(7); United States-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.7(6), May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore 
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore- 
fta/final-text; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on Trade Relations, U.S.-Viet., art. 7.8, July 13, 2000 [hereinafter U.S.-Vietnam 
Agreement], available at http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~vecon/download/uvta/text.pdf; 
Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 80. 
111 Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 80. 
112 U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 110, art. 16.7(6)(b)(ii); TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 32, art. 31(h). 
113 See Lindstrom, supra note 34, at 949 (noting that these rules are often more restrictive 
than U.S. domestic compulsory licensing laws given that compulsory licenses are broadly 
protected beyond situations of national emergency). 
114 See Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 80; Sell, supra note 33, at 454–55; Lind-
strom, supra note 34, at 949. 
115 See Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 80; Sell, supra note 33, at 454; Howden, 
supra note 13. 
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lacking access to affordable pharmaceuticals.116 Data exclusivity provi-
sions in U.S. FTAs with Guatemala and Vietnam, two countries strug-
gling with staggering poverty, have led to increased pharmaceutical 
prices by delaying generic competition.117 Moreover, the exclusion of 
compulsory licensing from FTAs or proposed FTAs with the Dominican 
Republic, Thailand, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
could lead to overwhelming public health challenges as generic com-
petition is strangled from the market while patent holders maintain 
monopolistic control over pharmaceutical prices.118 
A. Examples of How Rigid TRIPS-Plus Data Exclusivity Provisions Have Had 
a Deleterious Effect on Public Health 
 U.S. FTAs include rigid data exclusivity provisions that ultimately 
obstruct generic drug competition, resulting in disastrous public health 
consequences for destitute populations.119 Trade agreements with Gua-
                                                                                                                      
116 See Georgetown, supra note 71, at 15, 29, 32; Ana Revenga et al., The World 
Bank, The Economics of Effective AIDS Treatment, at xxxix–xl (2006); Brook K. 
Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 613, 708 (2004); Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–64; Collins-Chase, supra 
note 10, at 792; Carter, supra note 56. 
117 UNDP 2011, supra note 21, at 144; Anh Tuan Nguyen et al., Medicine Prices, Avail-
ability, and Affordability in Vietnam, S. Med Rev., Sept. 2009, at 2, 2; Shaffer & Brenner, supra 
note 103, at w960–64. 
118 See Georgetown, supra note 71, at 33; Revenga et al., supra note 116, at xxxix–xl; 
Gathii, supra note 95, at 470; Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Patents and Access to Antiretroviral Medicines 
in Vietnam After World Trade Organization Accession, 10 J. of World Intell. Prop. 201, 219 
(2007). Given the concessions required to sign U.S. FTAs, it is interesting to consider a 
country’s decision to assent to these agreements. See Sell, supra note 33, at 451. One com-
mentator notes that “[t]he U.S. [is] able to wield the carrot of increased market access and 
potential future investment along with the stick of economic coercion in order to get de-
veloping countries to sign on to much higher standards of intellectual property protec-
tion.” Id. Indeed, the United States utilizes its tremendous market power to secure signifi-
cant yields from LMICs. Gathii, supra note 95, at 438. Moreover, forum shifting enables a 
country to seek its trade objectives in an alternative forum. See id. at 443–44. WTO multi-
lateral negotiations pit competing interests of HICs and LMICs against one another. See id. 
at 438, 443. Amendments to the TRIPS Agreement are time consuming and may result in 
stalemate given the number of signatories and the ability of large LMICs to form opposi-
tion blocks against the interests of HICs. See id. at 446–47 (noting that Thailand, Brazil, 
and India established a formidable opposition block against HICs during the WTO Minis-
terial Meeting of 2003). “Forum shifting allows countries to choose a new forum where 
they will encounter less concerted resistance to their agenda, which in turn gives them 
more wiggle room or policy space to achieve their objectives more readily.” Id. at 443–44. 
Because countries are able to simplify and accelerate trade agreements bilaterally as op-
posed to multilaterally, these agreements are sometimes favored. See id. at 443–44, 446. 
119 See Nguyen et al., supra note 117, at 2; Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–
64; Carter, supra note 56. 
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temala and Vietnam illustrate the injurious effect that data exclusivity 
provisions have on access to affordable drugs.120 
1. Guatemala 
 The number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Guatemala has 
doubled since 2001; an estimated 62,000 people are living with the dis-
ease and less than 11,000 are receiving antiretroviral therapy.121 Fur-
thermore, approximately twenty percent of Guatemala’s largely rural 
population lacks regular access to health facilities and services.122 
TRIPS-Plus data exclusivity provisions exacerbate these public health 
concerns by restricting access to affordable pharmaceuticals in Guate-
mala where over fifty percent of the population lives below the national 
poverty line.123 
 The U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA) came into effect in Guatemala in 2006.124 The 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Nguyen et al., supra note 117, at 2; Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–64; 
Carter, supra note 56. Jordan, which ratified a trade agreement with the United States in 
2001, has also experienced the negative effects of data exclusivity provisions in U.S. FTAs. 
Rohit Malpani, Oxfam Int’l, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual 
Property Rules in the US-Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines 2 (2007); see Agree-
ment Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 15, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [herein-
after U.S.-Jordan FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade- 
agreements/jordan-fta. A recent study on the effects of data exclusivity provisions in the U.S.-
Jordan FTA demonstrated that of 103 drugs launched since 2001, which are no longer under 
patent, nearly eighty percent have no generic counterpart. Malpani, supra, at 9. Generic 
producers attribute this lack of competition to rigid data exclusivity provisions. Id. at 9–10. 
Rigid data exclusivity provisions have also contributed to elevated pharmaceutical costs as the 
same drugs in Jordan cost eight hundred percent more than in similarly situated countries 
with less stringent data exclusivity provisions. Id. (demonstrating that the same pharmaceuti-
cals in Egypt are significantly more affordable). Furthermore, drug prices in Jordan have 
risen by approximately twenty percent since 2001. Id. at 2. Given that nearly one-third of the 
country lives in poverty, higher drug costs as a result of rigid data exclusivity provisions strain 
access to necessary drugs for low-income populations. Id. at 5, 19. 
121 UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 201; World Health Org., UNAIDS, & UNICEF, Global 
HIV/AIDS Response: Epidemic Update and Health Sector Progress Towards Univer-
sal Access 191 (2011) [hereinafter Global HIV/AIDS Response 2011], available at http:// 
www.who.int/hiv/pub/progress_report2011/en/index.html. 
122 Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance: Guatemala, WHO, http://www.who.int/ 
countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_gtm_en.pdf (last updated May 2007). More-
over, sixty percent of all reported cases of malaria in Central America occur in Guatemala. 
Id. 
123 UNDP 2011, supra note 21, at 144; Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961. 
124 Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w966 n.1; Free Trade Agreements, Office of the 
U.S. Trade Rep., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-
dominican-republic-central-america-fta (last visited Jan. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Free Trade]. 
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DR-CAFTA is an agreement between the United States and six Central 
American countries, namely Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.125 Rigid data exclusiv-
ity provisions in the DR-CAFTA have prohibited a number of generic 
drugs from entering the Guatemalan pharmaceutical market, despite 
the fact that many of these drugs may successfully treat major causes of 
morbidity and mortality.126 For example, Pfizer’s Vfend, which is used 
to treat invasive fungal infections generally found in patients with com-
promised immune systems (like those suffering from HIV/AIDS), costs 
810% more than the generic version.127 Vfend, however, is subject to 
fifteen years of data exclusivity, thus barring generic producers’ access 
to clinical information, quashing competition, and granting Pfizer mo-
nopolistic pricing control.128 
 Similarly, data exclusivity provisions have restricted access to af-
fordable antiretrovirals.129 For example, the Guatemalan government 
provides a list of drugs that public organizations may procure at subsi-
dized costs.130 A generic antiretroviral was registered in 2004, yet when 
Abbott Laboratories’ patented version of the same drug, Kaletra, which 
costs 166% more than the generic pharmacological equivalent, was reg-
istered a year later, it was granted retroactive data exclusivity through 
2000—the patent expires in 2015.131 Accordingly, only Kaletra, and not 
the generic version, has been listed by the Guatemalan government as 
available through subsidized costs.132 Public organizations seeking the 
more affordable generic drug are required to procure the drug else-
where.133 Thus, rigid TRIPS-Plus data exclusivity provisions in the DR-
CAFTA have reduced or eliminated generic pharmaceutical competi-
                                                                                                                      
125 J.F. Hornbeck, Cong. Research Serv., RL31870, The Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) 1 (2005). 
126 Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–64. 
127 See id. at w962; PubMed Health, Voriconazole, U.S. Nat’l Library of Med. ( Jan. 1, 
2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMHT0001926/. 
128 See Chung, supra note 70, at 180–82; Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w962–63. 
129 See Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w962, w964. 
130 Id. at w960. 
131 Id. at w962–64. 
132 Id. at w964. 
133 Id. at w960. Another example is the Bristol-Myers Squib pharmaceutical, Plavix, 
which is used to treat heart disease. Id. at w961. Plavix is patented in Guatemala and sub-
ject to fifteen years of data exclusivity. Id. When Bristol-Myers Squib received a patent for 
Plavix, Guatemala revoked patents for four generic producers of the pharmacological 
equivalent of Plavix, thereby eliminating competition. Id. 
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tion, resulting in an inordinate pricing structure making critical drugs 
unavailable to much of Guatemala’s indigent population.134 
2. Vietnam 
 The United States signed a trade agreement with Vietnam in 
2000.135 When Vietnam adopted data exclusivity provisions as part of 
the agreement, the United States praised the country for its alignment 
with U.S. data exclusivity standards.136 From 2000 through 2005, the 
Vietnamese government saw a threefold increase in health spending, 
much of which was attributed to rising pharmaceutical costs.137 This is 
particularly evident in the pricing of antiretrovirals produced in Viet-
nam, which cost five to seven times more than the lowest international 
prices for the same pharmaceuticals.138 
 The precipitous increase in the cost of antiretrovirals occurred as 
HIV/AIDS became increasingly problematic in Vietnam.139 In 2009, an 
estimated 280,000 people were living with HIV/AIDS, a figure that has 
doubled since 2001, shortly after the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Agreement 
was reached.140 Nearly seven percent of all people living with HIV/AIDS 
in Southeast Asia live in Vietnam.141 In 2009, over fourteen thousand 
Vietnamese died from AIDS related causes.142 Additionally, only half of 
those in need of HAART currently receive antiretroviral therapy.143 Un-
der these conditions, stringent data exclusivity provisions limit access to 
medicines in Vietnam, exacerbating an already dire public health situa-
                                                                                                                      
134 See id. at w960–64. 
135 Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Vietnam, U.S. Dep’t. of State (Aug. 1, 2012), http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm. 
136 Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Pat-
ent/Registration Linkage, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 303, 326 (2008); see Peter Maybarduk, Burcu 
Kilic & Brook Baker, Vietnam and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Pub. Citizen ( June 
16, 2011), http://www.citizen.org/tppa-vietnam-summary. 
137 Nguyen et al., supra, note 117, at 2. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that 
pharmaceutical companies price medicines higher in Vietnam than in other countries. Id. 
138 Id. at 2–3. 
139 See UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 187 (providing a comparison of HIV/AIDS in 2009 
and 2001); Carter, supra note 56. 
140 UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 187; Maybarduk, Kilic & Baker, supra note 136. 
141 UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 187 (noting that of the 4.1 million people living with 
HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia, 280,000 live in Vietnam). 
142 Id. at 192. 
143 Global HIV/AIDS Response 2011, supra note 121, at 193 (noting that 49,492 citi-
zens are on HAART though over 96,000 citizens are in need of antiretrovirals). 
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tion in a country where fifteen percent of the population lives below the 
national poverty line.144 
 For example, like many LMICs, Vietnam requires greater access to 
second-line antiretroviral treatment.145 As HIV/AIDS evolves, it may 
grow resistant to first-line treatment, requiring second-line drugs, many 
of which are patented by multinational pharmaceutical companies.146 
One of these second-line pharmaceuticals is Kaletra from Abbott Labo-
ratories.147 It was recently reported that Abbott Laboratories has a pat-
ent pending for Kaletra in Vietnam, and it intends to use that patent to 
prevent the procurement of generic alternatives.148 Unyielding TRIPS-
Plus data exclusivity provisions prohibit the use of clinical data for at 
least five years (and upwards of fifteen years, as seen in Guatemala), 
thereby eliminating generic competition for a pharmacological equiva-
lent to Kaletra.149 Thus, Abbott Laboratories will be able to charge in-
ordinate prices, rendering access to affordable pharmaceuticals unat-
tainable for low-income populations gravely in need of second-line 
antiretroviral therapy.150 
                                                                                                                      
 
144 See Carter, supra note 56; see also Global HIV/AIDS Response 2011, supra note 121, 
at 193; UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 187; UNDP 2011, supra note 21, at 144; Maybarduk, Kilic 
& Baker, supra note 136 (detailing the impact of trade on health in Vietnam). Significantly, 
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dustries. See id. at 39–40. Still, the United States is likely to press for TRIPS-Plus provisions 
in the TPP, which may provide even more stringent data exclusivity standards, thereby 
further crippling public health and access to medicines in Vietnam. See Carter, supra note 
56; Maybarduk, Kilic & Baker, supra note 136. 
145 See Carter, supra note 56. 
146 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 951. 
147 See Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 534; Carter, supra note 56. 
148 See Carter, supra note 56. 
149 Kuanpoth, supra note 118, at 218; Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 534; Shaffer & 
Brenner, supra note 103, at w961, w964. 
150 See Global HIV/AIDS Response 2011, supra note 121, at 193; Kuanpoth, supra 
note 118, at 219; Carter, supra note 56. It is interesting to note that Vietnam is a recipient 
of HIV/AIDS funding through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
which enables countries to procure antiretrovirals in order to stem the tide of HIV/AIDS. 
See U.S. Dep’t of State, The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: Five-
Year Strategy 11 (2009) [hereinafter PEPFAR Report], available at http://pepfar.gov/ 
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B. U.S. Policy Towards Compulsory Licensing Severely Harms Public Health in 
Middle and Low-Income Countries 
 TRIPS-Plus provisions in U.S. FTAs discourage the use of compul-
sory licensing thereby restricting generic competition and furthering a 
patent holder’s monopolistic control of pricing, which results in re-
stricted access to affordable drugs.151 These potentially negative effects 
of U.S. policy towards compulsory licensing are illustrated in two pro-
posed, but stalled, FTAs with Thailand and the Southern African Cus-
toms Union.152 
1. Dominican Republic 
 The island of Hispaniola, comprised of the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti, contains approximately eighty-five percent of all HIV/AIDS 
cases in the Caribbean, the region with the second highest per capita 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS after sub-Saharan Africa.153 In 2009, an esti-
mated 57,000 people living with HIV/AIDS were domiciled in the Do-
                                                                                                                      
strategy; Maybarduk, Kilic & Baker, supra note 136. PEPFAR is active in nearly forty coun-
tries and by 2009 had provided HAART to over 2.4 million people worldwide. PEPFAR 
Report, supra, at 11; U.S. Dept. of State, Countries, PEPFAR, http://www.pepfar.gov/coun- 
tries/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). Using PEPFAR funding, the United States often 
procures generic pharmaceuticals, including in Vietnam, where ninety-eight percent of 
antiretrovirals purchased by the United States are generic. See Carter, supra note 56. The 
remaining two percent are patented second-line treatments like Kaletra. See id. Thus, the 
United States employs competing policies in Vietnam. See Carter, supra note 56; Maybar-
duk, Kilic & Baker, supra note 136. First, data exclusivity provisions prolong the patent for 
Kaletra, thus obstructing generic competition and increasing the cost of treatment. See 
Carter, supra note 56; Maybarduk, Kilic & Baker, supra note 136. At the same time, how-
ever, the PEPFAR program seeks affordable pharmaceuticals to purchase in order to treat 
persons living with HIV/AIDS in Vietnam. See Carter, supra note 56; Maybarduk, Kilic & 
Baker, supra note 136. The patent on Kaletra prohibits the PEPFAR program’s procure-
ment of more affordable second-line treatment, projecting the increased costs on to U.S. 
taxpayers who fund PEPFAR. See Carter, supra note 56; Maybarduk, Kilic & Baker, supra 
note 136. 
151 Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 80; Sell, supra note 33, at 454. The United 
States’s stance on compulsory licensing is perplexing given its prior and threatened use of 
these licenses. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 939. For example, in 2001, the United 
States threatened to grant a compulsory license for Bayer’s Cipro in response to an An-
thrax scare. Pier DeRoo, Note, “Public Non-Commercial Use” Compulsory Licensing for Pharma-
ceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs, 32 Mich. J. Int’l L. 347, 359 (2011); see 
also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 939 n.76 (explaining that “the United States 
makes greater routine use of compulsory licensing of patent inventions for a variety of 
government purposes than most other countries combined”). 
152 Revenga et al., supra note 116, at xxxix; Baker, supra note 116, at 708; Gathii, su-
pra note 95, at 470; Sell, supra note 33, at 476; Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 798–801. 
153 Rahul Rajkumar, Note, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech 433, 459 (2005). 
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minican Republic, with 3,200 new infections that year.154 Also in 2009, 
an estimated 2,300 people died from AIDS-related causes.155 TRIPS-
Plus compulsory licensing provisions further exacerbate the Dominican 
Republic’s public health landscape by contributing to rising pharma-
ceutical costs and discouraging generic competition, thereby limiting 
access to affordable drugs in a country where fifty percent of the popu-
lation lives below the national poverty line.156 
 Although it has never issued a compulsory license, the Dominican 
Republic maintains liberal compulsory licensing provisions in its na-
tional intellectual property law.157 Moreover, the Dominican Republic’s 
commitment to compulsory licensing as a vital mechanism for securing 
access to medicines is evidenced by the fact that the Dominican Repub-
lic was a sponsor of both the Doha Declaration and the Article 31bis 
Amendment, which sought to ease the process for issuing compulsory 
licenses.158 The Dominican Republic also maintains a strong generic 
pharmaceutical industry with generic firms controlling approximately 
fifty percent of the domestic pharmaceutical market.159 In fact, the in-
troduction of generic antiretrovirals in the Dominican Republic led to 
a ninety-nine percent decrease in their cost.160 
 The Dominican Republic ratified the DR-CAFTA on March 1, 
2007.161 TRIPS-Plus provisions in the DR-CAFTA have been character-
ized as the most “onerous” protections among all U.S. FTAs with 
LMICs.162 Researchers assert that by 2027, the Dominican Republic will 
                                                                                                                      
154 UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 201, 206. 
155 Id. at 206. It is also important to note that the Dominican Republic has seen a dra-
matic increase in the incidence of malaria with nearly five hundred thousand reported 
cases of malaria in 2010. WHO Malaria Report 2011, supra note 19, at 110. 
156 See Georgetown, supra note 71, at 15, 19, 29, 32; UNDP 2011, supra note 21, at 
143. 
157 See Georgetown, supra note 71, at 14; Rajkumar, supra note 153, at 456–58. 
158 See Rajkumar, supra note 153, at 458. 
159 See id. at 459. 
160 Georgetown, supra note 71, at 2. For example, approximately seventy percent of 
HIV/AIDS patients in the Dominican Republic use Abbott’s Kaletra. Id. at 15. Before a 
generic version of Kaletra had been produced, the average international price of Kaletra 
was $183 per patient per month, which is equivalent to the average Dominican’s monthly 
income. See id. In 2007, however, Abbott faced generic competition after Thailand issued a 
compulsory license for Kaletra and the average international cost of Kaletra decreased to 
$83 per patient per month. Id. If Kaletra had been patented in the Dominican Republic, 
Dominicans would likely have faced prohibitively high pricing, however, because Kaletra 
was not patented in the Dominican Republic, Dominicans benefitted from Thailand’s 
issuance of the compulsory license. See id. 
161 See Free Trade, supra note 124. 
162 Georgetown, supra note 71, at 25. 
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experience a nine to fifteen percent increase in pharmaceutical prices 
as a result of the DR-CAFTA.163 Evidence of TRIPS-Plus compulsory 
licensing provisions on price increases and diminished access to phar-
maceuticals, however, is already prevalent as illustrated by the second-
line antiretroviral Efavirenz, which costs three times more than its ge-
neric pharmacological equivalent.164 
 TRIPS-Plus patent provisions in the DR-CAFTA effectively bar com-
pulsory licensing by linking marketing approval of generic pharmaceu-
ticals to the consent of patent holders.165 Thus, if a generic drug com-
pany developed the pharmacological equivalent to Efavirenz under a 
compulsory license issued by the Dominican Republic, the generic pro-
ducer would still be required to obtain consent from the patent holder 
to sell the generic version of the drug, which is highly unlikely.166 Be-
cause debilitating poverty prohibits procurement of brand name 
Efavirenz and compulsory licensing provisions constrict generic compe-
tition, Dominicans are forced to use a similar but slightly more harmful 
drug, Nevirapine.167 Nevirapine may weaken a patient’s immune system 
if provided too early in the progression of HIV/AIDS, thereby further 
compromising the patient’s health.168 By delaying treatment, however, 
individuals diagnosed with HIV/AIDS face the same risk of a weakened 
immune system.169 
 Given rampant poverty and rising pharmaceutical costs, one 
healthcare provider suggested that Dominicans have the bleak choice 
of, “[buying] medication [or] buying lunch.”170 TRIPS-Plus compulsory 
licensing standards included in the DR-CAFTA have paralyzed the Do-
                                                                                                                      
163 Id. at 34. 
164 Id. at 19. 
165 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, DR-
CAFTA, art. 15.9, Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter DR-CAFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta; 
Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 85; Rajkumar, supra note 153, at 468. 
166 See DR-CAFTA, supra note 165, art. 15.9; Georgetown, supra note 71, at 19; Ra-
jkumar, supra note 153, at 468. 
167 Georgetown, supra note 71, at 19; Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 85; Ra-
jkumar, supra note 153, at 468. 
168 Georgetown, supra note 71, at 19. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. This desperate situation is illustrated by Dominican women infected with Hepa-
titis B. Id. at 5–6. Given that a Dominican woman typically earns less than $200 per month 
and likely has no health insurance, being diagnosed with Hepatitis B is extremely detri-
mental because the standard Hepatitis B treatment costs approximately $1,320 per month. 
Id. Lack of treatment for Hepatitis B leads to liver failure—notably another side effect of 
Nevirapine—and most certainly death. Id. at 5–6, 19. 
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minican Republic from utilizing this TRIPS-compliant method of pro-
viding affordable access to antiretrovirals and other drugs.171 
2. Thailand 
 In 2002, an estimated 670,000 people were living with HIV/AIDS 
in Thailand.172 The Thai government recognized the threat posed by 
the pandemic and initiated a national HIV/AIDS program aiming to 
provide its citizens with universal access to HAART.173 The program has 
been widely successful; the number of people receiving treatment rose 
from 3,000 in 2002 to 52,000 by 2005.174 The annual number of 
HIV/AIDS related deaths prior to the universal access program was ap-
proximately 52,000, but in 2009, after several years of universal access, 
that number decreased by nearly fifty percent.175 By 2010, nearly sev-
enty percent of those in need of antiretroviral therapy received treat-
ment.176 Thailand’s commitment to universal access to antiretroviral 
therapy has been praised by the World Health Organization and non-
governmental organizations from around the world.177 The most criti-
cal aspect to the success of the universal access program has been the 
Thai government’s ability to promote the availability of inexpensive 
generic antiretrovirals.178 
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176 See Global HIV/AIDS Response 2011, supra note 121, at 192. Moreover, nearly 
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ment. Id. at 163. 
177 Ministry of Pub. Health of Thai. & World Health Org., External Review of 
the Health Sector Response to HIV/AIDS in Thailand 35–36 (2005), available at 
http://203.90.70.117/PDS.DOCS/B0181.pdf; Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, 
MSF Welcomes Move to Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thai (Nov. 29, 2006), available 
at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=1905. 
178 See Gawain Kripke & Stephanie Weinberg, Oxfam Int’l, Public Health at 
Risk: A US Free Trade Agreement Could Threaten Access to Medicines in Thailand 
4 (2006), available at http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/public-health-at-
risk-a-us-free-trade-agreement-could-threaten-access-to-medici-114576. 
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 To ensure the success of the HIV/AIDS program, however, Thai-
land required access to patented second-line pharmaceuticals.179 These 
patented medications are significantly more expensive than the generic 
alternatives.180 For example, Abbott’s Kaletra cost well over two thou-
sand dollars per patient per year, limiting the Thai government’s provi-
sion of the medication to six hundred patients out of eight thousand in 
need.181 The World Bank reported that by issuing compulsory licenses, 
Thailand could reduce the cost of second-line antiretroviral treatments 
by ninety percent.182 Thailand attempted to negotiate reduced prices 
for several pharmaceuticals, including Kaletra, but failed to reach an 
agreement.183 Thus, in late 2006 and early 2007, the Thai government 
issued compulsory licenses for two antiretrovirals, including Kaletra, 
and a third compulsory license for Plavix, a pharmaceutical used to 
treat cardiovascular disease.184 
 The United States and Thailand began negotiating a trade agree-
ment in 2004, but suspended negotiations in 2006 following a military 
coup in Thailand.185 The World Bank concluded that TRIPS-Plus provi-
sions in the proposed U.S.-Thailand FTA would have crippled Thai-
land’s ability to issue compulsory licenses, resulting in costs exceeding 
3.2 billion dollars over twenty years.186 
 U.S. FTAs permit challenges to compulsory licenses on the grounds 
that the license was not warranted under the specific circumstances.187 
Given that Abbott Laboratories and Thailand were unable to reach an 
                                                                                                                      
179 Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 534. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Revenga et al., supra note 116, at xxxix–xl. 
183 Ho, supra note 77, at 412; Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 534. 
184 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 952; Ho, supra note 77, at 413–14. The Thai 
government received sharp criticism for issuing these compulsory licenses, though many 
scholars have asserted that Thailand’s actions were within the confines of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 956 (“There is little doubt that Thailand would 
win a dispute settlement action based on the TRIPS-compliance of its government use licens-
ing.”); Ho, supra note 77, at 424–43; Jerome H. Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of 
Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 247, 256 
(2009) (stipulating that Thailand’s “approach was a perfectly ‘legitimate’ exercise of the 
State’s powers under the TRIPS Agreement”). 
185 Thailand, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/ 
southeast-asia-pacific/thailand (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
186 Kripke & Weinberg, supra note 178, at 19; Revenga et al., supra note 116, at 
xxxix–xl. Although Thailand would have received economic benefits from a U.S.-Thailand 
FTA, estimates suggest that those gains may have been negated by projected drops in eco-
nomic production typically experienced by countries with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. 
Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 790. 
187 Lindstrom, supra note 34, at 949. 
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agreement about the price of Kaletra, it is likely that Abbott Laborato-
ries challenged the Thai government’s decision to issue a compulsory 
license.188 In fact, Abbott was so furious with Thailand’s issuance of a 
compulsory license for Kaletra, that it withdrew several pending phar-
maceutical patents from Thailand—an unprecedented move in which a 
U.S. drug company retaliated against a foreign government by cutting 
off the supply of certain pharmaceuticals.189 If Abbott Laboratories were 
to prevail in such a challenge, Thailand may have been subject to U.S. 
sanctions and may have been required to discontinue the license.190 
Thus, rigid TRIPS-Plus compulsory licensing provisions in the proposed 
U.S.-Thailand FTA may have curbed Thailand’s use of this critical 
mechanism for improving access to affordable antiretrovirals necessary 
for Thailand’s remarkably successful HIV/AIDS program.191 
3. The Southern African Customs Union 
  Perhaps nowhere on Earth has the scourge of HIV/AIDS afflicted 
more people than the members of the Southern African Customs Un-
ion (SACU), which is comprised of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Swaziland.192 The SACU is burdened by over twenty percent 
                                                                                                                      
 
188 See Ho, supra note 77, at 412; Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 534; cf. Matthews, supra 
note 50, at 136 (arguing that Thailand’s issuance of compulsory licenses “lowered the bar” 
with regard to patent protection for pharmaceuticals); Carter, supra note 56 (describing 
Abbott Laboratories’ angry response to the Thai government’s decision to issue a compul-
sory license for Kaletra). 
189 See Carter, supra note 56. Thailand’s issuance of a compulsory license for Plavix is 
another example of how rigid TRIPS-Plus compulsory licensing provisions in the proposed 
U.S.-Thailand FTA could limit access to drugs. Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 789; Mat-
thews, supra note 50, at 136. The global community was concerned about Thailand’s com-
pulsory license for Plavix given that it was the first license issued for a chronic, as opposed 
to infectious, disease. Matthews, supra note 50, at 136. The proposed U.S.-Thailand FTA 
limited the issuance of compulsory licenses for public non-commercial use, national 
emergencies, or to limit anticompetitive practices. Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 789. 
Given that U.S. FTAs do not define these terms, it is foreseeable that pharmaceutical com-
panies could have challenged the issuance of a compulsory license for Plavix on the 
grounds that heart disease should not be considered a national emergency. See Ho, supra 
note 42, at 1486; Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 80. 
190 Cf. David A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 331, 392, 400–02, 408 
(2007) (describing dispute resolution under U.S. FTAs). 
191 Kripke & Weinberg, supra note 178, at 19–20; Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 533–
34; Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 789; Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra 
note 177. 
192 See Danielle Langton, Cong. Research Serv., RS21387, United States-Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Background 
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of the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, as approximately seven million peo-
ple living with HIV/AIDS inhabit SACU member countries.193 The 
SACU member countries are rife with poverty as nearly one-quarter of 
the population in each country live below the national poverty line.194 
This rampant poverty has quashed access to antiretrovirals, with less 
than sixty percent of those in need of treatment currently receiving 
therapy.195 Despite extreme poverty, the SACU forms a formidable trad-
ing block and has agreed to treaties with several European countries, 
South American countries, and is in the midst of negotiating a trade 
agreement with India.196 
 In fact, in 2003, the United States and the SACU entered negotia-
tions to establish a U.S.-SACU FTA.197 The United States insisted on sev-
eral TRIPS-Plus provisions, many of which are similar to those included 
in current U.S. FTAs.198 The SACU nations expressed particular con-
cern over the proposed compulsory licensing provisions.199 The United 
                                                                                                                      
and Potential Issues 1 (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
109530.pdf; UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 180. 
193 UNAIDS, supra note 19, at 180 (noting that in 2009, approximately seven million 
people living with HIV/AIDS lived in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swa-
ziland, representing twenty-one percent of the entire global HIV/AIDS population); see 
also WHO TB Report 2011, supra note 19, at 123–25 (providing that the SACU member 
states had nearly half a million citizens infected with tuberculosis in 2010); WHO Malaria 
Report 2011, supra note 19, at 220 (finding over sixty thousand suspected cases of malaria 
in SACU countries). 
194 UNDP 2011, supra note 21, at 144. In Lesotho, fifty-seven percent of the population 
lives below the national poverty line; in Swaziland, approximately seventy percent of the 
population lives below the national poverty line; in Botswana, thirty-one percent of the popu-
lation lives below the national poverty line; in Namibia, nearly forty percent of the popula-
tion lives below the national poverty line; in South Africa, nearly twenty-five percent of citi-
zens live below the national poverty line. See id. 
195 Global HIV/AIDS Response 2011, supra note 121, at 190–92. Botswana and Na-
mibia have been extremely successful in providing affordable antiretrovirals to persons 
living with AIDS. See id. In Botswana and Namibia, ninety-three percent and ninety per-
cent, respectively, of those in need of antiretroviral therapy currently receive treatment. See 
id. Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland have struggled to achieve similar success as cover-
age rates for antiretroviral therapy in each country is fifty-seven percent, fifty-five percent, 
and seventy-two percent, respectively. Id. 
196 Southern African Customs Union, Bi-lateral Trade Negotiations, SACU, http://www. 
sacu.int/traden.php?id=414 (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
197 See Langton, supra note 192, at 1. 
198 See Gathii, supra note 95, at 470. 
199 Id. The SACU member nations also expressed serious reservations about the data 
exclusivity provisions within the proposed agreement as the United States sought to in-
clude a five-year minimum period of data exclusion on pharmaceuticals. See id.; Collins-
Chase, supra note 10, at 792. These rigid data exclusivity provisions would have limited the 
impoverished SACU countries’ ability to provide access to affordable medicines. See Gathii, 
supra note 95, at 470; Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 792. 
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States sought to impose a ban on exportation of pharmaceuticals devel-
oped by compulsory licenses, which would have prohibited South Af-
rica’s generic pharmaceutical industry from supplying SACU nations 
with affordable drugs, including antiretrovirals.200 Thus, rigid TRIPS-
Plus compulsory licensing provisions in the proposed U.S.-SACU FTA 
would have compromised access to generic drugs that SACU nations 
rely on to handle the scourge of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.201 
 The SACU refused the TRIPS-Plus provisions that the United States 
obstinately sought, recognizing that such compulsory license provisions 
would limit the delivery of affordable medicines, and as a result, nego-
tiations stalled in 2006.202 Nevertheless, in 2008, the United States and 
the SACU signed a Trade, Investment, and Development Cooperative 
Agreement that “establishes a forum for consultative discussions, coop-
erative work, and possible agreements on a wide range of trade issues” 
which would “[i]deally . . . put in place the ‘building blocks’ for a future 
FTA. . . .”203 Given the tremendous burden of HIV/AIDS on SACU na-
tions, standard U.S. TRIPS-Plus compulsory licensing provisions could 
provoke devastating consequences.204 
III. Promoting Access to Medicine Through Amendment  
of U.S. FTAs 
 TRIPS-Plus provisions in U.S. FTAs have come under fire and have 
even been criticized by Congress.205 The congressional response to 
TRIPS-Plus provisions in the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy has 
fallen short of addressing the burdensome data exclusivity and compul-
sory licensing provisions in U.S. FTAs.206 To remedy these shortcom-
ings, the United States should amend all U.S. FTAs to incorporate a 
balancing test that would provide review panels an opportunity to 
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203 Southern African Customs Union, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., http://www.ustr. 
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note 10, at 792, 801. 
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weigh the benefits and detriments associated with relaxing data exclu-
sivity and compulsory licensing provisions for various drugs.207 
A. The Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy 
 In response to criticism that U.S. FTAs undermine the Doha Dec-
laration and restrict LMIC’s access to affordable drugs, Congress and 
the Bush administration reached the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade 
Policy in May 2007.208 The agreement sought to promote public health 
and access to medicines by adding or changing language for future 
U.S. FTAs.209 For example, new FTAs still require five year data exclusiv-
ity provisions, but when a foreign country relies on marketing approval 
granted by the U.S., the five year period begins immediately after the 
drug is approved in the U.S.210 This encourages pharmaceutical com-
panies to seek patents from the U.S. and its trading partners simulta-
neously, because the “clock is ticking” on the five years of protection 
once U.S. regulatory approval is granted.211 Thus, this new provision 
                                                                                                                      
207 Cf. Foster, supra note 41, at 205–10 (utilizing a balancing test to differentiate be-
tween necessary and unnecessary copyright infringement regarding the international 
trade of educational materials); Gantz, supra note 190, at 391–92 (detailing the role of the 
Joint Committees). 
208 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 964; Ho, supra note 42, at 1503; Puym-
broeck, supra note 27, at 532; Ruse-Khan, supra note 39, at 331. U.S. Representative Henry 
A. Waxman has asserted that: 
[b]y delaying generic drug approvals, extending patent terms, limiting com-
pulsory licensing, prohibiting parallel importation, and otherwise restricting 
countries’ efforts to improve access to affordable drugs, [U.S. FTAs] under-
mine the safeguards outlined in the Doha Declaration. These agreements 
may offer advantages to multinational pharmaceutical companies, but they 
do so at a serious cost to public health in the developing nations. 
See Waxman, supra note 205, at 13 (quoting Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 
209 See Ho, supra note 42, at 1503; Rangel, supra note 39, at 400–05. Congressman 
Charles B. Rangel, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee at the time, pos-
ited five fundamental principles for the policy: (1) ensuring that U.S. FTAs improve stan-
dards of living while also creating new markets for U.S. products; (2) promoting American 
industries; (3) expanding and opening trade markets to provide new opportunities; (4) 
supporting those economically harmed by the effects of increased trade and technology; 
and (5) expanding national security and diplomacy by using trade and aid to foster devel-
opment in LMICs. Rangel, supra note 39, at 387–88. The Bipartisan Agreement on Trade 
Policy addresses numerous trade issues within U.S. FTAs, but is chiefly concerned with 
labor standards, intellectual property, and the environment. Id.; Ruse-Khan, supra note 39, 
at 331. 
210 See Rangel, supra note 39, at 404. 
211 See id. 
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truncates the waiting period faced by generic drug manufacturers and 
the populations that rely on more affordable medicines.212 
 Perhaps the most significant change to FTAs in the Bipartisan 
Agreement on Trade Policy is the inclusion of a statement regarding 
the importance of public health, which had previously only been sub-
mitted as a side letter.213 Though this language requires U.S. FTAs to 
affirm the Doha Declaration, provisions in the Bipartisan Agreement 
on Trade Policy are limited.214 For example, the language intended to 
reduce data exclusivity presumes that a country will be able to effi-
ciently and expeditiously administer its regulatory process or that the 
U.S. regulatory process moves at the same pace as regulatory schemes 
in other countries.215 Additionally, the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade 
Policy does not apply retroactively, and thus countries that signed U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
212 See id. Moreover, rather than requiring countries to “‘compensate for unreasonable 
delays,’” in regulatory approval by extending patent terms, FTAs now requires countries to 
“‘make [their] best efforts to process patent applications . . . . expeditiously with a view to 
avoiding unreasonable delays.’” See id. at 402 (quoting U.S.-Peru FTA, art. 16.9.6(a)). Rep-
resentative Rangel asserts that this provision promotes efficient regulatory practices, 
thereby avoiding delays which would result in patent extensions. See id. The agreement also 
addresses linkage systems by no longer requiring national health authorities to deny ap-
proval of generic pharmaceuticals without first certifying that no other patent rights are 
violated. Ho, supra note 42, at 1503; Rangel, supra note 39, at 403. 
213 See e.g., U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 102, art. 16.13; Ho, supra note 42, at 1504; Ruse-
Khan, supra note 39, at 31. The enforceability of side letters has been questioned given that 
they do not appear within the actual text of the FTA. See Carlos M. Correa, Protecting 
Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade 
Agreements 10 (2004), available at www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/ 
Correa_Bellagio4.pdf; Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 86. Moreover, the USTR had 
asserted that the side letters do not exempt parties from the intellectual property provisions 
within the FTAs. Roffe & Spennemann, supra note 66, at 86. The new FTAs include the fol-
lowing language: 
The obligations of [the Intellectual Property] Chapter do not and should not 
prevent a Party from taking measures to protect public health by promoting 
access to medicines for all, in particular concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well as circumstances of ex-
treme urgency or national emergency. Accordingly, while reiterating their 
commitment to this Chapter, the Parties affirm that this Chapter can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of each 
Party’s right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all. 
See Rangel, supra note 39, at 404–05. 
214 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 964; Ho, supra note 42, at 1503–04; Puym-
broeck, supra note 27, at 532–33. For example, the allegedly relaxed linkage provisions 
now require expeditious adjudication that some countries may be ill-equipped or unable 
to provide; this may encourage criticism and negate gains promoted by this particular 
revision. See Ho, supra note 42, at 1503. 
215 See Ho, supra note 42, at 1503; Rangel, supra note 39, at 403–04. 
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FTAs prior to 2007 have not benefited from these limited changes in 
U.S. trade policy.216 
 Finally, the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy does little to ad-
dress a country’s ability to enhance data exclusivity provisions or to issue 
compulsory licenses under U.S. FTAs.217 Given that data exclusivity and 
compulsory licensing are critical flexibilities provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement and affirmed by the Doha Declaration, the Bipartisan 
Agreement on Trade Policy may not enhance access to medicines.218 
Thus, to address the issues posed by Representative Henry Waxman, 
Congress should amend U.S. FTAs with a balancing test that would con-
sider the public health benefits of relaxing data exclusion and compul-
sory licensing with regard to pharmaceuticals.219 
B. Finding the Right Balance: Amending U.S. FTAs to Institute  
a Balancing Test 
 Restrictive data exclusivity and compulsory licensing provisions in 
U.S. FTAs impede access to affordable medicines in LMICs.220 Al-
though Congress attempted to remedy some TRIPS-Plus restrictions 
through the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy, data exclusivity and 
compulsory licensing provisions were scantly addressed or altogether 
ignored.221 Therefore, Congress should amend the agreements them-
selves through the Joint Committees, established in each FTA, to en-
hance access to medicines by instituting a balancing test for data exclu-
sivity and compulsory licensing.222 
                                                                                                                      
216 Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 532; Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w965. 
Thus, many signatories to U.S. FTAs do not receive these mild benefits, including signato-
ries to the DR-CAFTA, signatories to NAFTA, Israel, Jordan, Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Mo-
rocco, and Singapore. See Free Trade, supra note 124. 
217 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 964–65; Ho, supra note 42, at 1503; Puym-
broeck, supra note 27, at 532. 
218 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 31(b)–(h); Doha Declaration, supra note 
35, ¶¶ 4–5; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 964–65; Ho, supra note 42, at 1503; 
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221 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 42, at 964–65; Ho, supra note 42, at 1503–04; 
Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 532–33. 
222 Cf. Foster, supra note 41, at 205–10 (utilizing a balancing test to differentiate be-
tween necessary and unnecessary copyright infringement regarding the international 
trade of educational materials); Gantz, supra note 190, at 391–92 (detailing the role of the 
Joint Committees). 
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 U.S. FTAs include provisions designating responsibilities to Joint 
Committees.223 These committees are comprised of delegates from the 
United States Trade Representative and ministers, cabinet level repre-
sentatives, or their delegates from the U.S. counterpart in the FTA.224 
Joint Committees are responsible for dispute settlement as well as gen-
eral administration of the FTAs.225 For example, the committees may: 
(1) review the general functioning of the FTA; (2) oversee “further 
elaboration” of the FTA; (3) develop guidelines for proper implemen-
tation of the FTA; (4) consider adopting amendments to the FTA; and 
(5) facilitate the avoidance of disputes.226 Given these responsibilities, 
Joint Committees are ideal for establishing smaller working groups that 
could implement a balancing test to measure the benefits of relaxing 
data exclusivity and compulsory licensing provisions in U.S. FTAs.227 
 A balancing test would enable FTA signatories to weigh innovation 
and access, thereby eliminating seriously objectionable patent practices 
while at the same time promoting practices that would improve public 
health.228 An illustrative example of the need for such a test is the case 
of Egypt, where, in 2002, the Egyptian government granted regulatory 
approval for Pfizer to produce Viagra, an erectile dysfunction drug.229 
Just two months after Viagra entered the Egyptian market, the Egyptian 
Health Ministry, under pressure from local drug manufacturers, issued 
a compulsory license allowing a local manufacturer to produce a ge-
                                                                                                                      
223 See, e.g., U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 102, art. 20; DR-CAFTA, supra note 165, art. 19; 
U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 102, art. 19; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 102, art. 21; U.S.-
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227 See Gantz, supra note 190, at 391–92 (noting that Joint Committees are able to es-
tablish working groups to assist the administration of FTAs); cf. Foster, supra note 41, at 
205–10 (describing application of a balancing approach to conflicting rights). 
228 Cf. Foster, supra note 41, at 205–10 (detailing the use of a balancing test in response 
to copyright of educational materials between different countries in order to differentiate 
between necessary and unnecessary copyright infringement). The approach applied to 
copyright of educational materials could also address patent concerns in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. See id. 
229 Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 283, 306 (2008); see Foster, 
supra note 41, at 207–08. 
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neric version of Viagra.230 The generic version of Viagra was to hit the 
market at one-twentieth of Pfizer’s price.231 The Egyptian government 
cited the public health interests of the poor in defending its decision to 
enable generic versions of Viagra to flourish, though it seems unlikely 
that limiting a compulsory license in this instance would have resulted 
in dire public health consequences.232 
 Furthermore, the WTO has used balancing tests in the past when 
resolving disputes between trade partners.233 This three-part test bal-
ances: “(1) the importance of interests or values that the challenged 
measure is intended to protect; (2) the extent to which the challenged 
measure contributes to the realization of the end pursued by that 
measure; and (3) the trade impact of the challenged measure.”234 In 
the context of U.S. FTAs, the Joint Committees would conduct the bal-
ancing test when a signatory to the FTA requested the use of relaxed 
data exclusivity or compulsory licensing provisions in order to provide 
more affordable access to pharmaceuticals.235 
1. Importance of the Interests or Values That the Challenged Measure 
Is Intended to Protect 
 Under the first prong of the balancing test, the more important 
the interests and values (promoting public health and access to medi-
cine), the more likely that a Joint Committee will find the challenged 
measure (relaxing data exclusivity and/or compulsory licensing provi-
sions) necessary.236 It is unlikely that signatories to U.S. FTAs, including 
the U.S., would underscore the value of health.237 Therefore, the Joint 
                                                                                                                      
230 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 229, at 306–07. 
231 See Abeer Allam, Seeking Investment, Egypt Tries Patent Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2002, 
at W1. 
232 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 229, at 306–07. As a result of the Egyptian Health Min-
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Compounds and Pfizer’s Viagra Patent, 46 IDEA 283, 289 (2006)). Some assert that extensive 
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challenged measure will be deemed necessary); Foster, supra note 41, at 208. 
237 See Rangel, supra note 39, at 404–05 (explaining that Congress recognized the im-
portance of public health by explicitly acknowledging public health in the Bipartisan 
Agreement on Trade Policy and in subsequent FTAs). 
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Committees will need to develop more specific and tailored inquir-
ies.238 For example, the Joint Committees should consider the preva-
lence and incidence of a disease, which will provide evidence of the 
burden that the disease poses for the population at issue.239 The 
greater the burden of a particular disease, the stronger a country’s in-
terest in promoting access to drugs by relaxing data exclusivity or com-
pulsory licensing provisions.240 Another important consideration is de-
termining the potential impact of maintaining stringent data exclusivity 
or compulsory licensing provisions.241 If continued use of obstinate 
TRIPS-Plus provisions would significantly harm a country’s public 
health, then the balancing test should tip in favor of relaxing data ex-
clusivity and compulsory licensing standards.242 
2. The Extent to Which the Challenged Measure Contributes to the 
Realization of the End Pursued by That Measure 
 The more that a challenged measure contributes to the end pur-
sued, the more likely that the Joint Committee will recognize the meas-
ure as necessary.243 To evaluate this prong, the Joint Committee should 
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first prong of the balancing test within the context of copyright and educational materi-
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239 R. Bonita et al., World Health Org., Basic Epidemiology 18, 118 (2d ed. 2006), 
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Thailand recognized that HIV/AIDS placed an enormous burden on its population. 
Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 786. Although the Thai government may not have utilized 
a balancing test, it is likely the high burden of HIV/AIDS led to the issuance of several 
compulsory licenses. See Ho, supra note 42, at 413–14; Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 787. 
241 See Georgetown, supra note 71, at 34 (describing the life-threatening impact of 
failing to relax TRIPS-Plus provisions in the Dominican Republic, for example). 
242 See Georgetown, supra note 71, at 15, 29, 32; Foster, supra note 41, at 208 (noting 
that when the challenged measure promotes the value sought, for example public health 
or access to drugs, then the scale tips in favor of the challenged measure); Rangel, supra 
note 39, at 404–05; Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–64. 
243 See WTO Beef, supra note 41, ¶ 163 (concluding that, with respect of the second 
prong, the more that the challenged measure contributes to the end pursued, the more 
likely that the challenged measure is necessary). 
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consider current access to the particular pharmaceutical within the 
country seeking to relax data exclusivity or compulsory licensing provi-
sions.244 Extremely limited access to an affordable pharmaceutical 
would indicate that relaxed data exclusivity or compulsory licensing 
provisions could improve access.245 Moreover, the Joint Committee 
should assess how many people expect to gain access if these provisions 
are relaxed.246 The more individuals that would gain access to afford-
able pharmaceuticals under the challenged measure, the more likely 
that the challenged measure should be deemed necessary.247 Finally, 
the Joint Committee should evaluate how improved access to treatment 
will alleviate a particular disease.248 
3. The Trade Impact of the Challenged Measure 
 The Joint Committee should also consider the impact that loos-
ened data exclusivity or compulsory licensing provisions will have on 
trade.249 A slight impact on trade will tip the scales in favor of the chal-
lenged measure, while a considerable impact on trade may have the 
                                                                                                                      
244 See id.; Foster, supra note 41, at 208–09. See generally Global HIV/AIDS Response 
2011, supra note 121, at 1–9 (establishing access to antiretrovirals as a critical indicator to 
improving the HIV/AIDS burden). 
245 See Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–64; see, e.g., WTO Beef, supra note 
41, ¶ 163. For example, in Guatemala, the introduction of TRIPS-Plus provisions led to 
increased drug costs. See Shaffer & Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–64. In that case, be-
cause only fifty percent of those in need of antiretrovirals had access to treatment, apply-
ing the second prong of the balancing test, the Guatemalan government might conclude 
that relaxed data exclusivity or compulsory licensing provisions would improve access to 
antiretrovirals. See Global HIV/AIDS Response 2011, supra note 121, at 191; supra notes 
121–134 and accompanying text. 
246 C.f. Foster, supra note 41, at 208 (noting that a government should provide data 
about the number of people that expect to benefit from a challenged measure to tip the 
second prong in favor of the challenged measure). 
247 See Georgetown, supra note 71, at 15, 29, 32; Foster, supra note 41, at 208; Shaffer 
& Brenner, supra note 103, at w961–64. 
248 See Kripke & Weinberg, supra note 178, at 4–5 (noting that the Thai government 
relied on access to affordable drugs to achieve success in addressing its HIV/AIDS prob-
lem and access to these drugs could be threatened by TRIPS-Plus provisions thereby negat-
ing the government’s success); Foster, supra note 41, at 208–09. For example, a country 
may consider Thailand’s success in improving access to HAART along with reducing the 
burden of HIV/AIDS to conclude that relaxed TRIPS-Plus provisions are necessary to alle-
viate the effects of a disease. See Puymbroeck, supra note 27, at 533–34. See generally Erin M. 
Anderson, Unnecessary Deaths and Unnecessary Costs: Getting Patented Drugs to Patients Most in 
Need, 29 B.C. Third World L.J. 85, 112 (2009) (encouraging the use of compulsory licens-
ing). 
249 See WTO Beef, supra note 41, ¶ 163. 
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opposite effect.250 For example, the Joint Committee should examine 
the amount of revenue that a patent owner derives from the drug at 
issue.251 If a drug company derives a significant amount of its income 
through a particular drug, the committee may disfavor relaxing data 
exclusivity and compulsory licensing provisions.252 The Joint Commit-
tee should also evaluate how the challenged measure will be used.253 
For example, a country seeking to issue a compulsory license for a drug 
in order to establish a strong export industry, thereby interrupting pric-
ing structures or trade within other markets, may not result in a favor-
able result for the challenged measure.254 
Conclusion 
 While Earvin “Magic” Johnson celebrated his remarkable health 
twenty years after contracting HIV, Hope Tukahirwa’s access to life-
saving pharmaceuticals remains in a tenuous balance of competing in-
terests. TRIPS-Plus data exclusivity and compulsory licensing provisions 
have stifled access to medicines and may continue to do so without in-
tervention. In 2006, then Senator Barack Obama said “[l]ike no other 
illness, AIDS tests our ability to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes—
to empathize with the plight of our fellow man.”255 By amending U.S. 
FTAs to promote a balancing of innovation and access, the United 
States will truly affirm its commitment to public health and ensure that 
millions of people like Hope Tukahirwa have access to the affordable 
pharmaceuticals they so desperately need. 
 
250 See id. (providing that when the challenged measure has a relatively slight impact 
on trade, it is more likely that the challenged measure is necessary). 
251 See id.; see, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline, Global Public Policy Issues: Regulatory Data Protection, 
GSK (Aug. 2011), www.gsk.com/content/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/GSK-on-reg- 
ulatory-data-protection.pdf ( justifying data exclusivity provisions because they represent a 
fair return on the development of clinical data). 
252 See WTO Beef, supra note 41, ¶ 163; Foster, supra note 41, at 209–10; GlaxoSmith-
Kline, supra note 251. 
253 Cf. Foster, supra note 41, at 209–10 (considering the way in which the challenged 
measure will actually be used is a critical aspect of determining the impact of the chal-
lenged measure). 
254 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 116, at 708; Bird & Cahoy, supra note 229, at 306–07; Fos-
ter, supra note 41, at 209–10 (noting that the third prong favors a challenged measure 
when it does not affect trade markets of other countries); Collins-Chase, supra note 10, at 
801. 
255 William Crawley, The Purpose-Driven Presidency, BBC (Dec. 3, 2006, 3:48 PM), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/ni/2006/12/the_purposedriven_presidency.html (quoting Barack 
Obama). 
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